



# Apeiron

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## APEIRON

**Apeiron:** *unlimited, indefinite*

1. The *arche* or source constituting the beginning or principle of all things was, according to Anaximander, the *apeiron*, the unlimited. The term is capable of various constructions, depending upon how one understands the limit. 2. More generally, indetermination, i.e., without internal limits, and so without beginning or end. 3. An undergraduate journal of philosophy and religion for students of all majors at Washington College.

## Forward

People often say about their lives that, "Everything happens for a reason." The Greeks thought so too, as did the medieval philosopher-theologians and the Enlightenment *philosophes*. The anxious search by the Greeks for the ultimate determinants of human and natural events laid the bulwark for Western philosophical and scientific inquiry. Philosophy bestowed on the world the deep and often pre-conscious conviction that the universe is fundamentally orderly and intelligible, apart from whether we ever can know its reasons. Where does order originate? Are all events governed by it? Where do human choices fit? Where is the line of individual responsibility drawn? Asking why things happen as they do yields innumerable approaches, but usually few pat answers. Aristotle strained to rid his countrymen of the belief that life is ruled by blind Fate and Lady Fortune. Twenty-five centuries later we still lament or rejoice in our luck, and in our ruminative moments we wonder if God is watching or if our fate is one with the stars. The contributors to this third annual issue of *Apeiron* have taken questions of fate and fortune, cause and destiny, well in hand. Year after year our contributors show that many of the truly important questions in this world do not die at the hands of new discoveries or events, or slip beneath the churning waves of intellectual fashion.

Veteran co-editors Misty Christensen and Jennifer Sutphin upstage the exceptional quality of their last issue. They achieve this with the help of a strong group of contributors. Thanks to our authors and editors, this third annual issue of *Apeiron* finds the journal flourishing. Thank you and enjoy.

*Peter Weigel*

## Introduction

We are very pleased to note that the contributions to our third annual issue of **APEIRON** inquire into the big questions by going well beyond the usual limits of everyday thinking. This year, we offer two sets of comparative essays on teleology, or purposiveness, in natural events, as well as essays on Jungian spirituality and personal identity. Jennifer Sutphin and William Spencer debate the existence of God in essays on William Paley's famous Argument from Design. Daniel Garro and Misty Christensen delve into the realm of luck and chance in Aristotle. David Hosey offers a study on Carl Jung and the Spiritual Journey. Finally, Timothy Huston examines John Locke and Thomas Reid in an attempt to synthesize a new theory of personal identity. In this issue we invite you to step back and see things in a new light.

The editors would like to thank Professor Peter Weigel for generously donating his time while on a sabbatical leave this semester.

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## Contents

Design of Analogy .....	6
by Jennifer Sutphin	
Paley's Teleological Argument and Its Significance .....	12
by William Spencer	
Aristotle on Chance and Luck.....	18
by Daniel Garro	
Chance and Luck: Causes or Mere Phenomena? .....	23
by Misty Christensen	
Jung, Campbell, and the Spiritual Journey.....	26
by David Hosey	
Continuity of Consciousness: Locke on the Self .....	38
by Timothy Huston	

## Design of Analogy

Jennifer Sutphin

In 1838, William Paley presented an Argument from the Design of the Universe in his *Natural Theology* that argues for the existence of an intelligent cause for all other things in existence. The argument centers on a single analogy comparing the universe to a watch and God to a watchmaker. It is vital to examine this analogy, for if it fails so does the argument. Here I will show that Paley's argument from analogy is a strong one, perhaps far more so than his critics realize. This can be seen by first studying the structure of a generic argument from analogy, giving special attention to the criteria used to determine the strength of the argument, and then applying these standards to Paley's specific argument from analogy.

By definition an argument from analogy is an inductive argument in which the similarity of characteristics among all the cases provides justification for the conclusion. Basically the argument says that if object X has some characteristics A, B, and C, and object Y has characteristics A and B, then object Y must also have characteristic C as well. This can be further explained by looking at the following example. The last ten Halsman paintings sold at Big Bob's Auctions all sold for at least five hundred dollars. Since the next painting up for auction at Big Bob's is a Halsman, it will probably sell for at least five hundred dollars. In this example, the previously sold paintings represent object(s) X, the new painting represents object Y. The auction house, painter, and price represent characteristics A, B, and C. This type of argument has three main parts: the objects being compared, the analogy, and the characteristics in question. In the example, the objects being compared are the ten Halsman paintings that sold in the past and the next Halsman painting to be auctioned. The analogy is the statement of comparison; in this case the old paintings are compared to the new in terms of auction house, and painter, and price. Lastly, the characteristic in question is the price the next painting will sell for. A strong argument from analogy meets the following criteria: a) the cases are relevant to the conclusion, b) the cases are substantial in number, c) there are

few disanalogies, d) there is variety in the past sample, and e) the scope of the conclusion fits the scope of the analogies. The sample argument is a good argument from analogy because it meets all five of these criteria. The past cases are all relevant to the conclusion because they all involve paintings by a specific artist being sold at a specific location which is mentioned in the conclusion. The fact that there is more than one past case strengthens the argument. There are few disanalogies in the argument, which is to say that the things being compared are relatively similar in the way they should be if the conclusion is to be persuasive. For example, all of the paintings in this question are similar in size, age, construction, and content. While the variety in this argument may be somewhat limited, it is sufficient for the given conclusion. The final criterion to examine is the scope of the conclusion. In a good argument from analogy the scope of the conclusion should not surpass the scope of the analogy. In this case, this means that the expected price is close to the prices quoted for other paintings of the same type. The conclusion would surpass the scope of the analogy if the expected price was much higher than the previous prices. Since the expected price is reasonable in relation to previous prices for this type of art work, the conclusion does not surpass the scope of the analogy.

A false, or weak, analogy is not strong enough to support the conclusions drawn. This means the analogies made contain comparisons irrelevant to the conclusion in question. The following example is a weak argument from analogy. The last black dog I had used to bite, and the last black dog my friend Sam had also used to bite, so all black dogs must be extremely vicious. This argument is weak because it does not support the conclusions drawn; it fails in all five criteria for a strong argument from analogy. The trait of color does not necessarily connect with the trait of aggression in dogs. Other factors such as genetics, environment, and previous training all combine to shape a dog's temperament. Moreover, there are not enough past examples; two dogs cannot substantiate a claim about the whole species. There are not enough similarities between cases. The argument would be stronger if the dogs being compared were similar in more ways, say in breed or age. This sample



lacks variety because of its small numbers; variety does not exist in a population of two. Finally the scope of the conclusion does not match the scope of the argument. There is not enough information provided in the comparison to make a generalization about all dogs. Now that we have distinguished the difference between a strong argument from analogy and a weak argument from analogy, we can move into Paley's specific argument.

In *Natural Theology* Paley is attempting to prove that God, traditionally thought of as some sort of intelligent creator, exists because there is order and purpose to the universe. This argument hinges on a single analogy which can be stated in the following way. Imagine that you are walking in a field and you happen to notice a watch lying in your path. You see, "that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose."<sup>1</sup> This is to say that the parts of the watch seem to be adjusted in a way that allows it to produce a motion which can track the flow of hours in a day. You see that if the parts were in a different arrangement, if even one part was the wrong size, the watch would cease functioning. For Paley, this harmonious function of integral parts in which each seems to have a purpose is the essence of design. If the watch has a design, then Paley argues it must have had a designer: "the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some place or other, an artificer, or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it to actually answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use."<sup>2</sup> Paley then goes on to say "every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature."<sup>3</sup> An example of this design in nature would be the human eye. The human eye is made up of complex parts which work together to serve a purpose, namely to give sight to humans. As with the watch, any slight change in the parts of the eye can damage its function. Since nature possesses design then it must have a designer, and since the

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<sup>1</sup> William Paley, "From *Natural Theology*," in *Classic Philosophical Questions*, eds. James A. Gould and Robert J. Mulvaney, Tenth Edition (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall), 93.

<sup>2</sup> Paley, 94.

<sup>3</sup> Paley, 96.

design is much greater than that of a watch, it follows that nature must have a greater designer. For Paley, this designer is God.

Now that Paley's argument has been considered, it is time to pull it apart into its composite pieces and subject it to the criteria for a good argument from analogy. First, I offer a restatement of the argument in line with the earlier examples. A watch has a certain order to it; it is designed in a way that reveals it to have purpose, namely, that it functions as a timepiece. Things which have a purposeful design must have a designer. The universe has an order to it, and the way it is designed is suggestive of purposive design in its ordered and harmonious function. Therefore, the universe must have a designer. This argument relies on one past case, the watch. There is also one shared characteristic – design, as indicated by harmonious function of integral parts. Finally the characteristic in question is the presence of a designer. Now that the argument has been restated and defined, it can be evaluated.

Relevance is the first criteria for evaluating an argument. As far as I am concerned, Paley's argument meets the relevance requirement. Granted, a watch and the universe may not always be similar enough to make an analogy, but I do not think that is important in this specific case. Paley is using an established principle, the teleological argument, which says that God's existence can be proven from a single experience of design. Paley is filling in the blanks of an established argument to prove his point. This makes the comparison and conclusion very relevant even though the objects seem dissimilar at first glance.

As to the number of past cases, Paley only gives one example. However, this does not diminish his case. The nature of the teleological argument is that of one singular experience. Paley could have listed every purposeful object and its maker, but instead he supplies a principle that can be independently applied to the objects around us: objects which have a purposeful design have a designer. This is, in my view, enough to fill this requirement.

The disanalogy criterion is where Paley often finds objections, but I tend to disagree. Paley defines purposive

design in terms of integration of parts. For Paley, knowing the end purpose of an object is not necessary to find purposive design we only need to look for parts organized such that manipulation of one profoundly changes the whole. This means that we do not need to prove the universe has an existential purpose. We only need to admit that manipulation of the parts, no matter how great or small, profoundly affects the whole. In this sense, both the universe and the watch have purposive design for Paley. Once one admits that the universe has a purposive design in the same way that a watch has a purposive design, I find that Paley can account for the difference in complexity. Paley freely acknowledges that the universe is greater than a watch; presumably this is what allows us to see God as the designer, because the designer of the universe would necessarily be greater than any watchmaker. All grandeur aside, the universe is mechanical in nature; it is both predictable, and also affected by the destruction of even one tiny piece of itself. My heart beats one hundred and four times a minute, the metronome of my being. Push it faster and I sweat and pant, slower and I grow pale and weary. It is simple biology. Oxygen atoms bond to hydrogen atoms predictably and all on earth that is thirsty can drink. It is elementary chemistry. Even love is, at its base, ragged breaths, racing hearts, and pheromones released and received unconsciously. Yes, it is all terribly frightening and complex but underneath it is all simple science. Simple design controls the most complex of universes just as it controls the simplest of watches.

The criterion of variety in a past sample can be addressed similarly to the criterion for the number of cases. Paley is working off of an argument that asks for one single experience, but he just as easily could have listed all the purposeful objects he could think of. Since it a teleological argument, variety is not important.

As for the final criteria, scope of the conclusion, I assert that the conclusion fits his argument. That said, there are some additional provisions. First, one has to see the mechanical similarity between a watch and the universe. Second, one has to accept that the universe has a purpose, at least in the sense that Paley understands purpose. While we may be able to

debate the existential purpose of the universe, remember that Paley's definition of purpose is based in harmonious function. The idea that change or removal of even a small piece can change overall function is evidence enough of purposive design for Paley. Those two things accepted, then it is logical to conclude that what has a design has a designer and that the universe, because of its design, must have a designer. In addition, Paley has several possible replies to objections in his argument. Several of them shed light on some popular objections to the existence of God which strengthens the scope of the conclusion by pointing out some similarities between God and the watchmaker. For example, Paley says that if we could not physically see the watchmaker we would not be able to deny his existence, just as we should not deny God's existence based on a lack of visual observations alone.

All in all, I would argue that Paley is making a good argument from analogy in *Natural Theology*. The argument meets all the criteria for a good argument of this type and Paley's attention to other possible arguments strengthens his position on the whole. Stepping away from the analogy, I can certainly see problems with the argument. It is, for example, very hard to prove that the universe has purpose no matter how mechanical it may be. Since this fact is a given in the analogy I have to say that Paley is right, we may be a lot more complicated than watches, but underneath there is always some plan to make us tick.

## Paley's Teleological Argument and Its Significance

William Spencer

Throughout history, humans have marveled at our surroundings and tried to explain the mysteries of the universe. We answer these questions the only way we can, by creating supernatural ideals like God. Over time some of these explanations have become so ingrained in our minds and societies that we now in turn need to explain them. This is where William Paley's teleological argument comes into play. He famously compares the universe to a watch in an attempt to draw the conclusion that the universe was designed by an intelligent mind, as a watch is. I believe that this argument reveals more about the nature of humanity than that of the universe, as I will argue here.

Paley explains his argument in the following way. If one were to come across a watch in the middle of a field, it would be natural to assume that it had originated in a watchmaker's shop and been brought to the field. This is because the watch displays design and has a visible purpose, which is to tell time. Paley says that it is absurd to suppose that merely the laws of nature or a series of random accidents could produce a machine which counts off minutes and hours with such efficiency. Even if the watch did not work, the fact that it was clearly meant to serve this purpose indicates that it was designed by an intelligent mind.<sup>1</sup>

According to Paley, this argument applies to nature as much as it applies to a watch. The contrivances of nature, however, are far greater than any produced by the hands of man, and therefore the intelligent mind that produced them must be proportionally greater than that which produced the watch. While he may be correct that the contrivances of nature are much greater than those of man, it does not necessarily follow that there must be intelligent design present. In order to see this

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<sup>1</sup> William Paley, "From *Natural Theology*," in *Classic Philosophical Questions*, eds. James A. Gould and Robert J. Mulvaney, Tenth Edition (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall), 93.

we must first examine the ideas of purpose and order, and decide how these are present in nature.

Order in nature is produced by the different properties inherent in different types of matter. For example, each type of atom has a different set of properties, which causes them to fall into certain arrangements. These different arrangements, called elements, interact with each other according to the properties that they possess, and so forth. These properties allow certain things to happen while making others impossible. This is not purpose, for I would not say that it is the purpose of hydrogen to bond with oxygen and form water, or to be explosive in its gaseous form. These are merely results of its properties. However, when we get to higher orders of matter, such as organic life, we start to see what is undeniably purpose. The structure of the eye, to use Paley's example, serves the purpose of providing sight to the brain, allowing it to interpret the world around it. Thus I must agree that there is purpose in nature. Modern science indicates that purpose arises from this mindless order. The properties of matter enabled living organisms to arise, and it is the nature of this life (reproduction with some errors, making one organism more adept at survival than another) that allows such purpose to develop. For if one creature has a rudimentary eye while another has none, surely the creature with an eye will be more likely to pass on its genes.

One might suggest that order is the way that God implements design. I would say that this is the perfect occasion to use Ockham's razor, which states that one should not explain something using many entities or concepts where fewer will suffice. Why do we need God to give the world order when it would be more prudent to say order is inherent in matter? In other words, by saying that an eternal God created the basic laws and materials which allow all other things to come to be, one is including an entirely unnecessary step. Not only would it be simpler to say that the laws of the universe and basic building blocks of matter are eternal, but it also leaves less unexplained. We can unravel the mysteries of matter, energy, and physics, and there is no indication that our knowledge of these subjects will stop increasing any time soon. God, on the

other hand, is inherently mysterious and unknowable. I can see why some would be more comfortable accepting the eternal nature of an unknown God over the matter which makes up our very bodies and the laws that allow us to exist. However, I find the notion of an eternal universe easier to accept than the idea that some immaterial and eternal being exists, and is able to call all that we know into existence. This may seem to be a matter of personal preference, but as said earlier, the simpler explanation is more desirable if it can explain things as well as the more complex one.

Many would still say that the fact that life exists at all merits wondering, because the conditions necessary for life to arise are so delicate and exact that the chances of them ever occurring would be unfathomably small. Thus, one might say that some external force is still required in order to set the stage for life. Suppose one were to reply, "But if things had turned out any other way, we would not be here to wonder." It is unlikely that the opposition would be convinced. Something more is required to explain the world. While these people say that life is highly improbable and merits explanation, I think the opposite. It would be much more remarkable if, in this vast and ever changing universe full of millions of planets, there were not one single instance of life. The same goes for the idea that the conditions on earth are so well suited for life. Chances are, in the eternal history of the universe, that such conditions would arise on a planet at some point. Humans, being one of the more intellectually advanced organisms in existence, are simply in a position to marvel at the odds.

Richard Swinburne has an interesting objection to this line of argument. He asks us to imagine a madman who has kidnapped a person and put him in a room with a card shuffling machine.<sup>2</sup> This machine has ten decks of cards, and it will select one card from each deck at random. In the case that any of the ten cards drawn is not the ace of hearts, the machine will detonate a bomb instantaneously, killing the victim. Imagine the machine produces ten aces of hearts on the first try, sparing the victim. Swinburne claims that the fact that the victim would

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<sup>2</sup> Richard Swinburne, *The Existence of God* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

not be alive to perceive any other result is insufficient to explain what happened. According to him, the odds that the machine would draw ten aces of hearts are so small that, if it happened, one could not possibly avoid the conclusion that there were forces other than chance involved. He says that the universe is the same way. The laws of the universe, he claims, are so specifically tuned to enable life that some outside force must have had a hand in setting them. However, if these laws are eternal and unchanging, then there is no other way they could be set. The question of likelihood is not applicable to the basic laws of the universe, just as it is not applicable to God. God is said to be intrinsically self-explanatory, but because we have seen that the idea of God is unnecessary and superfluous, we can say that the basic ingredients of the universe are self-explanatory in God's stead.

The one objection that is left is that some things, such as the brain or digestive tract, seem far too complex to arise from sheer chance. However, this objection fails to take into account two things: how powerful evolution is as a driving force for organic development, and how much time there has been for such complex structures to arise. Because the universe is eternal, all possible forms of life must have arisen at some point and co-existed with each other. Therefore, there is not merely a good chance that a world such as ours should come to exist; in fact it is inevitable.

The biggest assumption contained in the teleological argument is that order and purpose, what Paley calls design, must arise from intelligence. This is not necessarily so. Science has done a great deal to show us how a few basic unalterable laws not only enable the basic building blocks of matter to form more complex materials, but force them to do so when they are placed in a close proximity with each other. Also, as we have already seen, the probability that intelligence such as ours should arise is not as small as one might have thought. Thus, it is just as likely, if not more so, that intelligence arose from mindless order, and not the other way around. Because we arose from this order, it is no surprise that there are striking similarities between our natural surroundings and the workings of our creations. Which scenario seems more likely? Is it a



grand intelligence creating all order and other intelligence, or does an inherent order give rise to life and intelligent minds? Some would still be prone to agree with the former, but any unbiased mind will see that the latter is much more reasonable and likely. Furthermore, if intelligence is not required to create purpose or order, and God is understood to be the fundamental driving force of the universe from which purpose comes, then the basic order of the universe and God could be said to be one and the same. For without intelligence, God need not be ascribed the traits of benevolence or omnipotence or love, but can retain all of the non-human characteristics, such as eternal existence, perfection, and omnipresence.

The question is why do we have this tendency to strive for proof of a God's existence when there are simpler and more reasonable explanations at hand? As mentioned earlier, we have used the idea of a God or gods throughout history to explain away any question that we could not find any other answer for. Now that we have gotten to a point where this explanation is not needed, many are unwilling to let go of the notion of God. This can be explained. Not only does God explain the order and purpose observable in nature, but God also helps make our lives seem more meaningful. If we are the product of a cold and efficient process such as evolution, then we are nothing more than animals that were lucky enough to evolve with a large mental capacity and opposable thumbs. If we are the product of God, then it is not a big step to conclude that a being capable of creating such purpose on a biological level would also want to give us a higher purpose, one on a spiritual level. If my rationality did not prevent me from doing so, I would gladly pick God over evolution.

Also, if one accepts my argument, then it becomes fairly obvious that man was not created in God's image, but rather the other way around. This would explain why such a perfect and unfathomable being can be described in scripture as having certain human characteristics, such as benevolence and love. If we alone are made in God's image, then it elevates us above the level of all other creatures, more so than our superior intellect already does. By anthropomorphizing God, and nature as well, we make the world and its cruel realities more

accessible, less threatening and alien. For if an all loving and benevolent God created us, then surely such a being would not allow us to be destroyed, we would surely have an afterlife to look forward to. The universe would not be so kind, however. If we were created by chance and physical laws, these same forces could eradicate us in a number of different ways, without reason or compassion.

The best consequence of our reluctance to deny God is morality. I feel that many humans are capable of acting in a constructive and socialized manner without the guidance of God, as well as the threat of eternal punishment. However, there are many who would choose to act selfishly if they were not worried about eternal damnation, and faith in God is the one thing that keeps these people in line. While morality and peace of mind are attainable without the aid of an immaterial force, faith in God nevertheless makes these things much easier to acquire.

One may ask, what are we left with in the absence of God? We become a chance occurrence in an eternity of mindless physical interactions. We come out looking like a bewildered species; one with brains advanced enough to comprehend the order of the universe and egos big enough to refuse to accept our tiny place in it. While this may seem to be true given my arguments, one can take a different lesson from this knowledge. The lesson is that we should cherish every opportunity to enjoy our lives and the world around us, and not spend precious time paying homage to some immaterial relic left over from the days of dragons and witches. Without God, we are free to find our own purpose, and make our own order in life. In the end, is that not more rewarding than letting someone else do so for you?

## Aristotle on Chance and Luck

Daniel Garro

In his *Physics*, Aristotle attempts to explain reality by reference to different types of causes. It should be noted that translating Aristotle's '*aition*' as 'cause' can be misleading. Current English usage of the word refers only to one type of cause that Aristotle gives, the efficient cause. A better term is explanation, that which accounts for a thing's existence or basic character. We will retain the word cause, but be mindful of its broader meaning in Aristotelian thought.

Aristotle investigates current beliefs about explanations for things to determine whether or not they are justified. Some current beliefs of his time claim that chance and luck are the causes of many things: "Other people make chance the cause of our heaven and of all worlds" (196a25).<sup>1</sup> Beliefs of this sort lead Aristotle to consider whether chance and luck can be considered as causes in their own right. Towards the end of his inquiry into chance and luck, Aristotle writes:

Chance and luck are causes of events <of the sort> that mind or nature might have caused, in cases where <particular> events <of this sort> have some coincidental cause. Now nothing coincidental is prior to anything that is in its own right; hence clearly no coincidental cause is prior to something that is a cause in its own right. Chance and luck are therefore posterior to mind and nature (198a).

Aristotle claims that chance and luck are posterior to mind and nature. Here I will offer an explanation of Aristotle's statement about chance and luck. First, I will try to show the type of events that mind or nature might cause and this will allow me to show how chance and luck are related to mental and natural phenomena. Second, I will offer an account of Aristotle's

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<sup>1</sup> Parenthetical references are to the Bekker numbers standard for Aristotle's works. All quotations from the *Physics* are from *Selections*, trans. Terence Irwin and Gail Fine (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1995).

distinction between a cause in its own right and a coincidental cause. Finally, I will present an interpretation of the above statement made by Aristotle, in light of these relevant distinctions. This will ultimately explain how chance and luck are posterior to mind and nature.

We begin with an account of events caused by the mind. Events caused by the mind have a purpose or end; that is, they fall into the larger category of events that are for something: "Events that are for something include both the actions that result from thought and also the results of nature" (196b20). When one makes a decision to do something, one is acting towards bringing about a particular goal. This is evident if one thinks back on any previous decisions one has made, for every decision is made with some sort of purpose or end in mind. One's deciding to do something is conditioned by a) the intended outcome of the action and, also, b) whether or not the action will affect the intended goal. We estimate, from our past experience, what an action always or usually brings about. For instance, in the morning I may have the options of sleeping in or getting up and making breakfast. After thinking the decision through, I decide to get up and make breakfast so I can start the day energized and awake. I am able to make the decision, because waking up and eating breakfast always or usually leads to my being more energized and awake. Thus my decision to get up initiated the action of making breakfast, with the intended goal of starting the day energized and awake.

In Aristotle's view, just as some events are caused by the mind, so are others caused by nature. Just as with events caused by the mind, events caused by nature have a purpose or end. For Aristotle, the form produced by an activity constitutes the end, and everything else is working towards that end (199a30). For example, a tree's leaves collect energy in order to produce simple sugars through the process of photosynthesis, allowing the tree to grow and to produce seeds. Therefore, the leaves' ability is a result of nature and is for a definite goal - to allow the tree to reach its end form, a mature tree. Similar to the actions resulting from thought, Aristotle believes that nature tends toward what is always or usually the case (198b35). Tree

leaves are always or usually able to photosynthesize, and thus their being able to do this is a result of nature.

Concerning events in which the outcome is neither always nor usually the case, Aristotle speaks about fortune. An event happens by luck if the action involves a conscious decision, but where the end result is neither always nor usually the case. For example, Jack decides to go to the store on Sunday to pick up milk. When he makes his purchase he is surprised to find that he is the millionth customer, making him the recipient of a five-hundred dollar shopping spree. Since Jack's decision to go to the store produced a result that is neither always nor usually the case, namely winning a contest, then it is a lucky event that he happened to be there on that day to win the prize.

Unlike events caused by luck, events caused by chance do not require a decision. Thus, chance extends more widely than luck (197b). Chance events are similar to events which are a result of nature, because chance events do not require a decision nor do they require an agent capable of decision. Aristotle gives an example of a chance event when he writes: "We say, for instance, that the horse came by chance, since it was saved because it came but did not come in order to be saved" (197b15). The horse, being incapable of decision, came by chance because it did not decide that it needed to be saved. However, the horse's coming resulted in its being saved, and therefore was a chance event. It is neither always nor usually the case that the horse needs saving, and yet the horse came so it was saved. Thus, luck and chance involve something that does not always or usually happen, and so the event is said to happen coincidentally.

Here we move to the second major distinction; however, only the former requires an agent making a decision. Aristotle distinguishes between a cause in its own right and a coincidental cause: "Hence the cause in its own right is determinate, but the coincidental cause is indeterminate" (196b25). Something is said to be a cause in its own right if the event that follows always or usually follows. This allows us to determine what the cause of the event was, and so the cause is determinate. For instance, my getting up and making breakfast always or usually leads to my being more energized

and awake. Therefore, my decision to get up is a cause in its own right, because the event that follows always or usually follows my action. I can determine what the cause of the event is, because my decision is conditioned by what always or usually happens. However, a cause is coincidental if the event that follows neither always nor usually follows. In this case we cannot determine the actual cause of the event, and so the cause is indeterminate. We cannot determine why the horse came, because the horse neither always nor usually needs saving. Therefore, the horse's coming is a coincidental cause. Thus mind and nature are causes in their own right, while luck and chance are coincidental causes.

We are now in a position to understand Aristotle's original statement as quoted on the first page of this essay. In this statement, Aristotle is replying to some current beliefs of his time, according to which chance was treated as a cause in its own right and attributed to the cosmos. In his reply, Aristotle notes that we are unable to have the idea of a coincidental cause (chance or luck) before we have the idea of a cause in its own right (mind or nature). We need experience and knowledge of what is always or usually the case before we can have experience or knowledge of what is neither always nor usually the case. Chance and luck, being indeterminate causes, cannot be posited as causes until we have the prior notion of determinate causes, mind and nature. Without knowledge of determinate causes all causes would be indeterminate. If all causes were indeterminate, we could have no notion of a cause at all, because all causes would be indistinguishable from one another. Therefore, we must have an understanding of a cause in its own right so we know what always or usually happens. If I didn't know that waking up and eating breakfast always or usually made me more energized and awake, I would not have been able to make a decision between sleeping in and getting up. It is only after we learn of a cause in its own right that we can have an understanding of coincidental cause. We have to know what always or usually happens first, and then this knowing allows us to determine when something out of the ordinary happens.

Thus, Aristotle is saying that we need to have an understanding of the events that mind or nature might cause before we can determine that a particular event of this sort has a coincidental cause namely, chance or luck. For example, we know that leaves always or usually have the ability to synthesize simple sugars, and we know that these sugars give nourishment to the tree allowing it to grow into a mature tree and to produce seeds. Since we know that this is always or usually the case with leaves, we are able to determine that the tree's growth and development was caused by the leaves' ability to synthesize simple sugars. By determining the cause that always or usually leads to the tree's growth and development, we have an understanding of a cause in its own right. This understanding allows us to know when something out of the ordinary happens, which we consider coincidental, and which for Aristotle involves a manner of speaking about a coincidence of causes not normally occurring together. In order to understand chance and luck we must first come to an understanding of how mind and nature operate as causes.

## Chance and Luck: Causes or Mere Phenomena?

Misty Christensen

In Book II, Chapter III of *Physics*, Aristotle discusses factors he finds necessary to explain the existence of the natural body.<sup>1</sup> He poses a series of questions that he feels must be answered in order to create this explanation. He says it is not possible to say what a thing is, without first knowing “why” it is. Asking why is similar to asking “what brought this thing into being?” When Aristotle asks why a thing exists, he means to ask what factors are responsible, i.e., what factors account for the existence of the natural body? He wants to find out what questions must be asked to understand the “why” of a given event.

Aristotle develops four questions he feels should be asked in order to explain the existence of the natural body, and with each question he gives an associated cause. 1) Out of what has something come? The “out of what” is known as the *material cause*. 2) What is that thing? What the thing is meant to be is known as the *formal cause*. 3) By what means, or agent, is that thing produced? This agent is known as the *efficient cause*, e.g., a mother is the efficient cause of her daughter. 4) For what end or purpose is that thing happening? (For the sake of what is it happening?) The purpose or end state is known as the *final cause*, e.g., a man reads for the sake of gaining knowledge. Knowledge is the final cause of his reading. It should be noted, however, that the Greek word translated as ‘cause’ (*aition*) actually means “responsible,” but we will use the English term ‘cause’ instead.

Aristotle says that all of the four causes are related to one another and it is impossible to separate them in the natural world. However, he also wonders if there is also a fifth cause, namely chance, which acts on the world. In order to further investigate this, he first gives definitions of chance as well as luck. I will suggest that chance is not a cause, but rather a mere

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *Selections*, trans. Terence Irwin and Gail Fine (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1995).



phenomenon, and that there is no such thing as luck. My case will follow Aristotle's definitions of chance and luck and their relationship with the natural world.

Chance is defined as a sort of occurrence in the natural world which could have been caused for a purpose, but instead is caused coincidentally. Chance is something applicable to situations involving animals or inanimate objects. An example of a chance event would be the following situation. Imagine a man is running down an alley in New York City after he just shot and killed another man. He runs past a building which happens to have construction work being done on the roof. A bundle of steel beams happens to fall from a crane on the roof and onto the unfortunate man, killing him. Completely by chance, the murderer is brought to justice.

Aristotle emphasizes that the key factor that distinguishes chance from luck is whether or not human intentions are involved. Since nature cannot be said to have intentions, but only tendencies and processes, nature cannot experience luck. Aristotle says that chance is the interruption of a natural process which produces an unusual result. For example, mutations and abnormalities in nature are a result of chance. If a frog is born with two heads (completely naturally, without any human intervention involved), the natural chain of causation is disrupted. As seen in this example, chance events occur without any purpose in themselves. Chance is seen as an event which happens to redirect things from reaching their typical end, bringing them to some other end.

Luck is similar to chance, because both phenomena occur with some sort of an end, only they arrive at that end coincidentally. Aristotle says that the only thing distinguishing luck from chance is that luck occurs exclusively among things which can think or decide to do something. Luck requires the presence of human intent. Essentially, luck is chance which occurs to humans, as Aristotle thinks that humans are the only things possessing true thought or decision making powers. An example of an event involving luck would be the following situation. A man goes to the market to purchase groceries for the week; the purpose of his trip is to buy food. While shopping, he happens to run into an old colleague of his who

owes him a sum of money. His colleague ends up paying him the money owed, and by luck the debt is repaid. The man is happy that the debt is repaid, however that was not the purpose of his trip to the grocery store. Also, it is likely that the colleague did not intend to repay the debt while on his trip to the store, but completely by chance the paths of the man and his colleague happen to cross, and the result of this crossing is having the debt repaid.

I believe that a “lucky” event is no more than a chance event which produces a favorable outcome. Conversely, “unlucky” events are merely chance events which produce an unfavorable outcome. Nevertheless, having produced a favorable outcome or not, it remains true that both of the events occur randomly. I believe that it is not human intentions which distinguish chance from luck, but rather whether or not the outcome of the event is a favorable one. We have already seen that the outcomes of both chance events and lucky events do not depend on what our intention for the situation might be. The outcomes of both events happen coincidentally regardless of how we intended the situation to occur. Aristotle says that events involving luck can only occur to humans because human intentions are involved. I think that because human intentions do not play a part on the outcome of the actual event, luck should not be regarded any differently from chance. The only difference is that humans are able to decide whether or not an event’s outcome is a favorable or unfavorable one.

## Jung, Campbell, and the Spiritual Journey

David Hosey

It was once true that people tended to address societal problems with purely religious explanations. Poverty, family strife, and suffering were blamed on sin and the Fall of Man. The Enlightenment, with its emphasis on human reason and progress, ended this trend. Some believe, however, that placing the emphasis for change in society on rational, social responses to issues has separated humanity from its necessary spiritual and psychological responses. Carl Jung, in *Man and His Symbols*, states that "modern man does not understand how much his 'rationalism' has put him at the mercy of the psychic 'underworld'".<sup>1</sup> Joseph Campbell expresses a similar sentiment in his *Myths to Live By*: "Those who think . . . that they know how the universe could have been better than it is, how it would have been had they created it, without pain, without sorrow, without time, without life, are unfit for illumination."<sup>2</sup> Both authors, however, are critical of modern religion and its role in the spiritual well-being of humanity. Campbell, who was influenced by Jung's view on dreams, myths, and symbols, presents a sharp critique of Christianity's response to the modern society's identity crisis. A closer look at Jung and Campbell's writings, however, makes it evident that a redeemed vision of Christianity and a new outlook on the struggle for peace and social justice can bridge the gap between spiritual and sociological methods for interacting with the changing world.

Carl Jung, like his mentor Sigmund Freud, emphasized dream interpretation, although his approach was more existential than reductive. The analytical approach to therapy which he conceived covers the totality of the human psyche, but the "major approach to the unconscious is through dream interpretation."<sup>3</sup> Jung approached dreams as messages from his patient's unconscious, messages which had to be interpreted in

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. Carl Gustav Jung, "Approaching the Unconscious," in *Man and His Symbols*, (Dell Publishing, 1964), 84.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Campbell, *Myths to Live By* (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1972), 104.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Edward F Edinger, "An Outline of Analytical Psychology," *Quadrant* (1968): 10.

the context of the whole individual. The unconscious as perceived by Jung is two-fold, consisting of the “personal unconscious,” which “contains personal contents belonging to the individual himself which can and properly should be made conscious,” and the “collective unconscious,” which is “composed of transpersonal, universal contents which cannot be assimilated by the ego.”<sup>4</sup> This collective unconscious contains symbols that are common throughout a particular culture and often cross-culturally. Jung called these collectively available symbols archetypes.

Jung’s archetypes are probably one of the most revolutionary of his ideas about the human psyche. As mentioned before, Jung felt that not only was there a personal unconscious which contains aspects of a person’s personality hidden from their conscious mind, but also a collective unconscious, which is “universal, supra-personal, and non-individual.”<sup>5</sup> This collective unconscious links humans with each other and with the deepest mists of the past. It manifests itself in dreams in the form of “archetypal images,” which are “to the psyche what the instinct is to the body.”<sup>6</sup> According to Jung, such archetypal images take the form of mythological symbols which also appear in cultures around the world. Thus, in order for the therapist to be helpful to a patient, the therapist must first “acquire a wider knowledge of [the] origins and significance . . . [of] ancient myths and the stories that appear in the dreams of the modern patient,” as pointed out by Joseph L. Henderson in *Man and His Symbols*.<sup>7</sup> Joseph Campbell certainly took this advice to heart, focusing his study on myths both ancient and modern.

In Campbell’s view, an appropriate mythology allows an individual to live an adjusted, affirming life in whatever conditions one lives in. Campbell sees mythology as the most important “differentiating feature . . . separating human from

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<sup>4</sup> Edinger, 5.

<sup>5</sup> Edinger, 6.

<sup>6</sup> Edinger, 6.

<sup>7</sup> Joseph L. Henderson, “Ancient Myths and Modern Man,” in *Man and His Symbols*, (Dell Publishing, 1964), 97.

animal psychology.”<sup>8</sup> Therefore, modern humans need mythology as much as ancient civilizations. Campbell blames many of the world’s problems on the human inability to reconcile myths with modern society:

With our old mythologically founded taboos unsettled by our own modern sciences, there is everywhere in the civilized world a rapidly rising incidence of vice and crime, mental disorders, suicides and dope addictions, shattered homes, impudent children, violence, murder, and despair.<sup>9</sup>

Jung corroborates this statement, referring to the world as “disassociated like a neurotic.”<sup>10</sup> If the social problems of the world are inherently rooted in psychological/spiritual disassociation from the collective unconscious, then they should be solved with individual psychotherapy. It is on this dissociation that Campbell bases his two primary critiques. He criticizes Christianity for its lack of adaptability to modern realities, and so too the struggle for social change as a denial of life’s inherent suffering. A close analysis of his statements in the context of his and Jung’s larger work, however, shows some basic flaws in Campbell’s argument which can be expanded into a redeeming image of Christianity, peace, and social justice.

Campbell’s extensive critique of Christianity is based on three main points: first, its inability to adapt to modern realities; second, its shortcomings when compared to Eastern mythology such as Hinduism and Buddhism; and third, its connection with peace and social struggle, which will be examined extensively. In short, Campbell sees Christianity as having a faulty view of the past, an impotent role in the present, and an unrealistic view of the future. In Campbell’s view, the basic teachings of Christianity are irreconcilable with science and any modern quest for truth. He describes an amusing episode of a child explaining to his mother that the

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<sup>8</sup> Campbell, 22.

<sup>9</sup> Campbell, 10.

<sup>10</sup> Jung, 73.

Christian creation story is incorrect based on scientific evidence.<sup>11</sup> He goes on to point out several examples of Biblical “history” which have been proven historically inaccurate, from the flood to the appearance of life on the planet to the plagues in Egypt.<sup>12</sup> Campbell has similar criticisms of the literal interpretations of such Christian miracles as Jesus’ resurrection and Ascension. With its historical background in question, he finds Christianity lacking, especially when compared to what he sees as the more adaptable religions of the East.

Campbell is very impressed with the philosophy and religion of the East. He refers to it as “the great East,” and compares the ideas of Buddhism and the identity of Self with God with what he sees as the exclusive, externally based spiritual ideas of Christianity.<sup>13</sup> The religions of the East offer a perfect example of Campbell’s ideal mythology: life-affirming, beautiful, and, because of their purely symbolic nature, adaptable to modern times. He refers to the *Bhagavad-Gita*, one of the most important texts of Hinduism, as a “song . . . of that spirit immortal that never was born, never dies, but lives in all things,” and states that this is a “universal song that is sung not in Indian art alone but in Far Eastern life as well.”<sup>14</sup> The Judeo-Christian Testament is, by comparison, “one of the most brutal war mythologies of all time.”<sup>15</sup> Christianity, meanwhile, can be reduced to “the crumbling medieval architecture of . . . [the] Church.”<sup>16</sup> In addition to this dichotomy, Campbell looks at both religions through the lens of war and peace and finds Christianity lacking.

Campbell divides all mythologies into two categories, mythologies of war and peace. His analysis centers on what he sees as the horrible beauty of the former versus the naiveté or hypocrisy of the latter. Simply put, mythologies of war accept the cruel facts of life and thus help people survive; mythologies

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<sup>11</sup> Campbell, 3.

<sup>12</sup> Campbell, 8.

<sup>13</sup> Campbell, 95.

<sup>14</sup> Campbell, 106.

<sup>15</sup> Campbell, 75.

<sup>16</sup> Campbell, 7.

of peace, however, deny such facts and thus lead to denial of the dark side of human nature in their followers.<sup>17</sup> He classifies Christianity as a mythology of peace that is interpreted ineffectively as a mythology of war in order to protect it; thus, Christianity, according to Campbell, is either not fit for survival or inherently hypocritical.<sup>18</sup> This analysis is rooted in Campbell's deeper belief about the reality of life. His affinity with Eastern religion is evident in his feeling that all life is suffering, and that suffering should not be fought against but affirmed. Anyone struggling for positive change is, in his view, missing the point: "All societies are evil, sorrowful, and inequitable; and so they always will be. So if you really want to help this world, what you will have to teach is how to live in it."<sup>19</sup> In this manner Campbell refutes Christianity and the struggle for peace and social justice in one fell swoop. He then moves merrily along his way after attacking the world's largest religion and the movement for a more equitable world that so many people have found so meaningful. Of course, all of this is done in the name of the health of the human psyche.

Campbell is an excellent storyteller and a distinguished scholar, and thus his arguments deserve to be seriously and critically examined. His most persuasive arguments are those against a literalist view of the Bible and Christianity, a well-supported and verified viewpoint. However, Campbell makes the mistake of identifying Christian literalists with all Christians, an unsupportable generalization. Although all Christians adhere to some form of literalism, e.g., the divinity of Christ, the importance of Hebrew Testament history receives varying degrees of emphasis in different churches. In fact, if a true Christian is one who takes into the essence of his or her life the teachings of Jesus Christ's life, death, and resurrection, it is obvious that Christianity is in fact a rebellion against a dogmatic and overly literal view of religion. Campbell does seem to appreciate the sayings of Jesus, but these sayings should also be a core part of a healthy Christianity.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Campbell, 169.

<sup>18</sup> Campbell, 89.

<sup>19</sup> Campbell, 104.

<sup>20</sup> Campbell, 157.

Campbell's point is that the historical foundations of mythology are much less important than their symbolic meanings; however, when he makes this point about Hinduism, he is quick to offer a redeeming story from Hindu myth, something he very rarely does for Christianity.<sup>21</sup>

In comparing Christianity to Eastern mythology, Campbell is often guilty of comparing the worst aspects of the former to the most beautiful, serene aspects of the latter. Certainly Christianity has its dark side. Nobody could or should deny the horrors committed in the name of Christianity during the Crusades, the Inquisition, and the conquest of the Americas, just to name a few cases. Yet in the name of the beautiful ideal of duty found in the East, some of the worst class warfare in the existence of humanity has been carried out. It may certainly be true that all life is suffering; however, a Hindu born into the highest priest sect will certainly experience a much smaller share of that suffering than one born into the Untouchable non-caste, with no hope of advancement. The Untouchable has sewer cleaning or hide tanning to look forward to for the rest of one's painfully short life. Campbell criticizes the inability of Western religion to create an identity with God in the Self, but his examples of those who have suffered for such a belief include Jesus, whose life and teaching are the very basis of Christianity.<sup>22</sup> Thus, Campbell's critique of Christianity in comparison with Eastern mythology is a contradictory one.

Every mythology, when put into the hands of fault-filled man, is prone to misuse. Kevin Brien expresses this in his dialogue "To Believe? - Or Not to Believe?" Commenting on Erich Fromm's classification of religions as either authoritarian or humanistic in nature, Brien identifies the Christianity of Christ as "the theistic religion that comes closest to completely realizing the ideal of humanistic religion" and the Buddhism of Buddha as "the non-theistic religion that comes closest to doing so."<sup>23</sup> All religions, according to Brien's interpretation of Fromm, have had both authoritarian and humanistic aspects

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<sup>21</sup> Campbell, 19.

<sup>22</sup> Campbell, 95.

<sup>23</sup> Kevin M Brien, "To Believe - Or Not to Believe? A Dialogue Concerning Religion, Politics, and Suffering," *Dialogue and Universalism* XIII, No. 7 (August, 2003):19.



throughout their history. In fact, the best aspect of religion across the board is not, as Campbell proposes, its ability to affirm suffering, but its “living heart” of love, something which is equally accessible in all religions, including the Christianity which Campbell so strongly critiques.<sup>24</sup> Campbell addresses the mythology of love, but fails to see the connection between it and the mythology of peace, a gap that must be bridged if the spiritual importance of the struggle for social change is to be understood.

In addition to the past and present, it is important to address Campbell’s critique of the Christian view of the future, which is inextricably linked to his negative view of the struggle for social change and peace in the modern world. Campbell ridicules people who want to change the world before discovering their own place in it: “Let me first correct society, then get around to myself,” is how he classifies the beliefs of many people in the modern world.<sup>25</sup> However, this classification ignores the struggles of many who have managed both to achieve individual spirituality and outward change - Martin Luther King, Jr., Mahatma Gandhi, Mother Teresa, Harriet Tubman, and the Christ and Buddha figures of mythology, just to name a few. A story of Gandhi related by teacher and writer Colman McCarthy serves to illustrate this point:

A story is told of a mother who walked from a distant village to visit Gandhi in his ashram. She brought her little boy. “He won’t stop eating sugar,” she told Gandhi. “It’s bad for his health but he won’t listen. But he’ll listen to you, Gandhi, you’re his hero. Please tell him to stop.” Gandhi looked at the boy, pondered, and told the mother to come back in one week. Slightly irritated - it was mid-summer and the village was far away - she left. The next week she came back with her child. Gandhi patted him on the head and told him to stop eating sugar, that it’s bad for one’s health. The mother thanked Gandhi profusely.

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<sup>24</sup> Brien, 31.

<sup>25</sup> Campbell, 104.

Walking to the gate of the ashram, she turned to ask Gandhi why he didn't say that the week before. "Mother, until one week ago I was eating sugar."<sup>26</sup>

Those figures who portray the highest aspirations of the movement for peace and social justice would firmly agree with Campbell that one should not try to change the world without first changing oneself. This is hardly the same as Campbell's statement: "if you really want to help the world, what you will have to teach is how to live in it."<sup>27</sup> Much more accurate would be Daisaku Ikeda's statement that "legal and structural reforms must be supported by a corresponding revolution in consciousness - the development of the kind of universal humanity that transcends differences from within."<sup>28</sup> It is important to learn to live in the world, while not, however, forgetting that much can be done to ease the suffering of others. Campbell brushes aside slavery, Jim Crow, and institutionalized caste brutality as the same sort of inevitable suffering that is present in nature, but it is not. It is suffering of a much different, human kind, and it can and should be changed.

What of war then? It is true, to an extent, that "killing is the precondition of all living whatsoever," in the sense that life feeds on life and returns to life in death.<sup>29</sup> Yet it is hardly this sublime, natural sort of killing which occurs in Israel-Palestine or on city streets from Fallujah to New York City. In Campbell's own words, "it is a basic idea of practically every war mythology that the enemy is a monster and that in killing him one is protecting the only truly valuable order of human life on earth, which is that, of course, of one's own people."<sup>30</sup> Yet this is a tribal ideal that has become a neurotic obsession in modern warfare. The war epics to which Campbell refers are relics of tribes inevitably fighting over limited resources. They

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<sup>26</sup> Colman McCarthy, *I'd Rather Teach Peace* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002), 43.

<sup>27</sup> Campbell, 104.

<sup>28</sup> Daisaku Ikeda, *For the Sake of Peace: Seven Paths to Global Harmony* (Santa Monica, CA: Middleway Press, 2001), 113.

<sup>29</sup> Campbell, 169.

<sup>30</sup> Campbell, 171.

are not written about artificial nations created to horde resources and elevated to what Paul Tillich refers to as an idolatrous extreme.<sup>31</sup> The purpose of a mythology of peace is to move past this tribally divided way of looking at the world, and this is a two part struggle, both inward and outward. Jung's statement, mentioned earlier, that the "world is, so to speak, disassociated like a neurotic" indicates that both the Self as an individual and the world as a whole are in need of healing. Campbell accuses the world of ignoring the Self, but one must be careful not to fall into the trap of ignoring the world.

A person who wants to follow this path, then, is faced with a difficult task. How does one reconcile Jung and Campbell's idea - that one must be more introverted and self-reflecting to learn how to deal with the world - with the ideal of extroverted, positive change? The answer is that the means and the ends must be made one. Any process of individuation must be achieved in such a way that is conducive to a positive, building interaction with the outer world. The reader of Jung and Campbell need not go far afield to find examples of such a simultaneously inward and outward change. This dual journey is present in the four stages of the animus analyzed by Jung's student M.L. von Franz in *Man and His Symbols*, which progresses from the "wholly physical man" to "wise guide to spiritual truth," an identity "often projected onto Gandhi" and thus tied closely to the bridge between individuation and peaceful struggle.<sup>32</sup> This same progression is described by Søren Kierkegaard in his four stages of human experience, from the aesthetic to the ethical (the stage which Campbell criticizes) through to Religion A and B, in which ethics are not left behind but made part of a more inwardly searching spiritual journey.<sup>33</sup> And this same dual journey is identified by Campbell, although not identified with peace and social justice, in his essay on the mythology of love.

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<sup>31</sup> Brien, 25.

<sup>32</sup> M.L. von Franz, "The Process of Individuation," in *Man and His Symbols* (Dell Publishing, 1964), 205.

<sup>33</sup> Matthew McNaught, "Précis of *Stages on Life's Way* (Kierkegaard)," classroom handout.

Campbell sums up the idea of the mythology of love in, surprisingly, a Christian teaching: "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you."<sup>34</sup> Perhaps his most compelling example of the power of love is in his study of Arthurian myth. His story of Parzival and the Muslim knight first fighting and then sitting down to reconcile their differences, discovering that they are brothers, is to him a symbol of the healing of the Self and the recognition of the God Within.<sup>35</sup> It can also be seen, however, as a symbol for the sort of non-violent interfaith healing that is so desperately needed in areas like Jerusalem and Kashmir. It is not surprising that love, the heart of religion and of peace, is the bridge over the gap between the search for individual meaning and the struggle for outward change.

If one returns to Jung, one finds yet more examples of the importance of the dual journey. The theory of "synchronicity," for example, expressed a "postulated acausal connecting principle . . . indicating that under certain circumstances events in the outer world coincided meaningfully with inner psychic states."<sup>36</sup> Jung is referring to the odd ability of dreams to, in a way, predict the future; however, synchronicity is yet another facet of a journey both inward to the Self and outward to the Other. The importance of synchronicity to the peace and social justice movement is addressed in an article by Leonard Felder in *Tikkun Magazine* entitled "Prayer as Rebellion": "Prayer is not a passive activity, but rather a way to stir things up and get things rolling. I think of Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel marching with Martin Luther King, Jr. and saying that they were 'praying with their feet.'"<sup>37</sup> Thus prayer, an introspective activity, is utilized effectively for positive, outward results, an example both of synchronicity and of the dual journey.

Certainly it is unlikely that anyone will achieve the ideal world conceived of by the struggle for peace and social justice. Campbell admonishes his readers to remember the words of the

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<sup>34</sup> Campbell, 157.

<sup>35</sup> Campbell, 166.

<sup>36</sup> Edinger, 12.

<sup>37</sup> Leonard Felder, "Prayer as Rebellion: What Happens When You Ask God for Help?" *Tikkun Magazine* 18, No. 4 (July/August, 2003), 62.

*Bhagavad-Gita*: "Wretched are those who work for results."<sup>38</sup>

It is not the end result that is important, but rather the struggle itself. Rev. King is not remembered because he achieved his Dream, but because he began the long journey towards it, a journey that a new generation of activists is called upon to continue. It is both an inward and an outward journey, and neither aspect of it should be marginalized or ignored.

According to Rabbi Michael Lerner, one of the founders of the Tikkun Community, "we reject all attempts at a spiritual politics that talks about 'values' while ignoring the material well-being of the human race . . . but we have also rejected the notion of a Maslow-based hierarchy of needs . . . and we call this framework a politics of meaning or an Emancipatory Spirituality."<sup>39</sup> Perhaps one of the most poetic expressions of this idea of achieving both internal, spiritual healing and external, material healing comes from the Hindu mythology that Campbell champions so firmly. In verses 9-11 of the Isha Upanishad, the speaker states:

In dark night live those for whom  
The world without alone is real  
Darker still, for whom the world within  
Alone is real. The first leads to a life  
Of action, the second to a life of meditation.  
But those who combine action with meditation  
Cross the sea of death through action  
And enter into immortality  
Through the practice of meditation  
So have we heard from the wise.<sup>40</sup>

These are hardly the words of a mythology dedicated only to acceptance of outward suffering, rather they recognize the importance of a dual journey, inward and outward.

There are many ways to embark on this dual journey, and Campbell - whether he realizes it or not - achieves one such

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<sup>38</sup> Campbell, 97.

<sup>39</sup> Michael Lerner, "Anyone But Bush? The Unbearable Lightness of Liberal Politics," *Tikkun Magazine* 19, No. 2 (March/April, 2004), 14.

<sup>40</sup> *The Upanishads*, trans. Eknath Easwaran (Berkely, CA: Nilgiri Press, 1987), 209.

way. The power of story, art, and music to create both internal and external change can never be underestimated. Campbell is at his best as a storyteller, and although he might focus on the inner importance of myths, these same myths have much meaning for the external world. Campbell, Jung, King, Lerner, Teresa are healers in a world in need of much healing. There is much work to be done, both in the Self and outside the Self. It is a never-ending struggle that must be continued until the Self and the Other are One, like Parzival and his brother, and the Dream is achieved. Whether the end result is possible is irrelevant to the larger importance of the journey.

## **Continuity of Consciousness: Locke on the Self**

Timothy Huston

John Locke has been a major influence on both philosophical thought and political theory. One of his more controversial and influential philosophical positions concerns his theory of personal identity. It concerns the problem of which factors makes a person the same person over time. For Locke, continuity of consciousness, enabled by memory, allows an individual to be the same person over time. Locke's proposal was designed with an agenda in mind. Locke wanted a concept of personal identity which could be reconciled with his views on personal responsibility in the case of legal accountability and concerning his Christian belief in a bodily resurrection. Locke's writings are clever and well-crafted, but at the same time they run into serious difficulties. A contemporary of Locke, Thomas Reid, is among his more notable critics. Reid's objections are extremely well-founded and intelligent. I will show that, by modifying Locke's theory to answer Reid's criticisms, a plausible version of Locke's theory can be salvaged.

John Locke's Christian beliefs brought him to the conclusion that the physical body was not what made someone a person, because the body ceases existing at death. However, Locke still did not believe that the mind or immaterial soul were all that personal identity involved. For Locke, personal identity is twofold in that one must not only be the same person, one must be actively aware of having the same identity. This may seem like circular reasoning, but Locke is presenting a strong argument for personal identity through continuity of consciousness. Continuity of consciousness functions through memory; it is the memory that one is the same self as one has always been.

Locke's theory is also designed to account for his beliefs involving legal accountability. As a founder of classic liberal thought, he knew that a man could not be held legally accountable for something that he did not do. Locke mentions

that people sometimes have lapses in memory and hence are literally not themselves in certain situations. Locke states that the legal system compensates for this:

But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons; which, we see, is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the mad man did, -thereby making them two persons: which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in English when we say such one is "not himself," or is "besides himself;" in which phrases it is insinuated, as f those who now, or tat least first used them, thought the self was changed; the selfsame person was no longer in that man.<sup>1</sup>

It seems then that Locke has presented an idea of personal identity which encompasses both Christian beliefs and notions of legal responsibility. Memory of one's own actions is the measure of responsibility in a court of law and at the resurrection. Despite this, his theory is not without its critics.

The most famous critique of Locke's theory comes from Thomas Reid. Reid levels several devastating criticisms at Locke. The first objection deals with the transfer of consciousness. If, as Locke proposes, consciousness can be transferred from being to being, duplicating a chain of memories could produce multiple instances of the same self. Reid finds this contradicts the notion of what personal identity is. In addition, Reid believes that Locke's language confuses consciousness with memory, as exemplified in Locke's discussion of transferring many persons into one biological organism. Reid objects on legal grounds as well; memory loss alone does not justify innocence. The fact that an individual

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<sup>1</sup>John Locke, "On Identity and Diversity," from *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1688), reprinted in *Philosophical Traditions: A Text with Readings*, ed. Louis Pojman (New York:Wadsworth Press, 1998), 294-296, 294.



does not remember committing a crime does not free him from legal responsibility. Reid would argue that we do, in fact, punish the sober man for the actions of the mad man or the drunk man. Reid's most telling criticism is his famous brave officer objection:

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life; suppose, also, which must be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr. Locke's doctrine, that he was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there by any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general's consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging; therefore, according to Mr. Locke's doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. Therefore the general is, and at the same time is not, the same person with him who was flogged at school.<sup>2</sup>

According to Locke's theory the old man is not the same person as the child. Even though his physical body is the same, his identity is not the same if continuity is limited to dependence on memory. Reid suggests that there are other ways to maintain the continuity of an individual. Memory for Reid is only an indicator of identity, it cannot constitute identity.

We must now ask if Reid's objections are sound. Reid's objection to Locke's claim that more than one person could be

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<sup>2</sup> Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785), III.2, reprinted in *Thomas Reid: Inquiry and Essays*, ed. R. Beanblossom (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1983), 216-217.

placed in an organism might be misguided. Locke does not really mean that consciousness can be separated from a mind or a body. He uses this example only to prove that there is no necessary connection, a point that is necessary to reconcile personal identity with Christianity. I would argue that consciousness is tied to thinking and thinking is done by the mind, so perhaps continuity of consciousness is dependent upon continuity of mind. Reid shows a fatal flaw in Locke's theory through the brave officer story. The personal identity of the general and the child would be different under Locke's proposal. Obviously, using memory alone to show continuity is inconclusive. This does not mean that the idea of continuity is completely hopeless. I believe there is something solid about knowing one is the same self over time.

Locke's idea of continuity of consciousness can be reconstructed into a theory which works. Reid rejects the idea of consciousness as independent of a mind. However some people believe that consciousness, mind, and body are independent, but that they all act on each other through our perceptions of each of them. As far as legal ramifications go, Locke is more correct than Reid. Despite the importance of legal responsibility, being in a severely altered state in most modern societies can relieve someone from legal responsibility, or at least lessen the criminal responsibility. Reid may have feared that Locke's theory would destroy the idea of personal responsibility and accountability. The main issue to be addressed when trying to salvage Locke's theory is the problem of the brave officer. Continuity might be better replaced by a linkage of consciousness and memory, but where continuity of consciousness does not only depend on memory.

I believe Locke's view of continuity is salvageable. A linkage of consciousness and memory can refute the brave officer example. The general remembers his middle years in the service, the middle-aged service man remembers his childhood, but the general does not remember his childhood. Despite this, there is a connection between the general and the child through the shared connection of his officer days. They are all part of his continuous stream of consciousness. This linkage of consciousness is based upon Locke's idea, but

replaces continuity of memory with linkage involving a continuous stream of consciousness.

Locke's work on personal identity was a breakthrough for the subject. Locke created a unique theory that attempts to satisfy all angles of his belief structure, without sounding crowded or nonsensical. The limitations of Locke's theory revolved around lapses in memory and what Reid calls confounding the evidence of personal identity with personal identity. I believe that Reid's criticisms for the most part are well-founded. In fact his criticism, that continuity confounds the evidence with what is trying to be proved, is the main strike against Locke's proposal and my version. I have shown that, with the proper changes, a version of Locke's theory can be salvaged. I believe that a link of consciousness and memory through one's life establishes personal identity and avoids complications such as the brave officer problem. This link of mental continuity allows consciousness and memory to connect people to past events and without a complete dependence on memory.

## **Contributors**

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